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1. In tro d u c tio n
In his study of the social structure of Brazil, the historian M a­
noel Maurício de Albuquerque (1981) emphasized th a t the elites 
of the country's Southeast upheld national unity in the ir own 
interest, though he does not unravel the financial mechanisms 
of this support. He does show the Paraguayan W ar to have 
been a last expansionist effort in South America by the slave- 
owning coffee aristocracy. The failure of this a ttem pt weakened 
the monarchic state, and quickened its downfall in 1889.
The aim of the first part of this essay is to show how the Mon­
archy found domestically financial resources to impose its cen­
tralism  on a country of continental dimensions, w hereas Span­
ish America became fragmented. The second aim is to demon­
stra te  how, soon after, the Brazilian Em pire employed the 
same methods to force its hegemony on the River Plate Basin.
The historiography of the republican period before the F irst 
World W ar analyzes financial aspects in depth, since several re­
forms in m onetary policy were im plem ented a t th a t time corres­
ponding to different political orientations. Two very precise mo­
m ents can be distinguished: the first, of Jacobine revolutionary 
tendencies, and the second, when the new agrarian  and conserv­
ative élites come to occupy the political scene. In these studies, 
exchange ra tes and m onetary policy play an em inent role, due 
to the economy's export characteristics and to the importance
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of its foreign debt which was renegotiated twice during this pe­
riod w ith the funding loans of 1898 and 1914. The domestic debt 
is system atically relegated to a secondary sta tus since it is an 
in ternal m atter, even though the reforms under study always 
include the public debt m arket in their range of targets, thus 
affecting one way or another the value of institu tional and pri­
vate portfolios. In an effort to close this gap, albeit in a prelim i­
nary fashion, the th ird  part of th is article will analyze the rea ­
sons which led the government of the time to indebt itself, and 
how it renegotiated its debt through various conversions.
It is quite obvious th a t the history of the Brazilian domestic 
debt has so far been neglected, especially if compared to the 
abundant analytic m aterial produced on the foreign debt 
(Fritsch 1988; Goldsmith 1986; Pelaez and Suzigan 1976; Neu- 
haus 1975). The sources are relatively numerous, though lack­
ing in homogeneity. We will present here only an initial explo­
ration of the data  contained in the tables draw n up by the Dire- 
toria de Contabilidade da Caixa de Amortização in the annual 
reports of the M inisters of Finance from 1827 to 1919. As com­
parative param eters, the fiscal revenues (from these same re ­
ports) and the development of the foreign debt, pu t together by 
Bouças (1950), will be employed.
For each of the periods covered, total fiscal revenue, as well 
as expenses effected by the m inistry, have been recorded. The 
additional funds w ith which the government provided for the 
deficits have been divided into domestic and foreign debt. We 
shall thus be able to show the relative im portance of fiscal re­
venue and debt funding. As the servicing of both domestic and 
foreign debts -  in terest and am ortization paym ents -  are includ­
ed in the Finance M inistry's expenses w ithout system atic la­
bels, the exact am ount of the debt service costs has been obtain­
ed by compiling am ortization paym ents and calculating in ter­
est from contractual rates. O ther useful information, such as 
the classification of bondholders by category and the quotation 
of these titles in the m arket will be shown for the years avail­
able. In order to facilitate comparison w ith other Latin  Ameri­
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can economies, am ounts in "mil-réis" have frequently been pre­
sented in pounds sterling.
2. D o m e stic  D eb t D u r in g  th e  F o rm a tio n  o f  th e  N a tio n a l  
S ta te , 1824-1850
Various factors contributed to the emergence of the public debt 
in Brazil. There was, in the first place, great unease about the 
first foreign loan -  of 1824 -  as British recognition of Brazilian 
independence was put as a requirem ent for granting the loan, 
which m anifested itself in a low ra te  (price of placement) of 85 
percent for one part of the funds and 75 percent for the other. 
Not considering these discounts sufficient, the Rothschilds 
transferred  to Brazil the responsibility for Portuguese loans 
obtained in London during the W ar of Independence. Secondly, 
D. Pedro I's absolutist tendencies led Parliam ent to take a se­
ries of m easures to lim it the Monarchy's financial capacity, 
such as the closing of the first Banco do Brasil and the esta­
blishm ent of the public debt along the lines of the G reat Book 
of the French Revolution. The executive was thus deterred 
from resorting to the bank's bond issues to cover the deficit, 
and the assets of the Em peror were finally separated from 
those of the state, requiring th a t any new credit operation be 
approved by Congress.
The law of November 15, 1827, determ ined th a t the adm ini­
stration of the Public Debt be carried out by the Caixa de 
Amortização. Its obligations included the regular paym ent of 
in terests and annual am ortization of one percent of ou tstand­
ing bonds, as well as intervening opportunely in the m arket to 
sustain  quotations. It would also register loans made directly 
to the person of the Em peror during the years of the W ar of In ­
dependence, consolidate the previous floating debt and convert 
into four percent bonds a loan placed to redeem forged copper 
coins circulating in Bahia.
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The government bonds were received favorably in the Rio de 
Janeiro m arket, though the Em peror's abdication in favor of 
his son -  still under age -  as a resu lt of liberal pressure, was 
m om entarily reflected in the fall of their price. By the following 
year, the Caixa de Amortização had opened a branch in Bahia 
to d istribute in the N orth-East its five percent bonds, usually 
given as paym ent to government suppliers. Domestic debt dur­
ing the Regency period (1831-1840) played an im portant role in 
the formation of the national state, supplying the resources 
w ith which the government would m ilitarily control the m ul­
tiple separatist movements which were then  emerging.
As early as 1835, the Finance M inister would point out the 
advantages of domestic over foreign indebtedness, given th a t 
the in terests and am ortizations paid would not be removed 
from in ternal circulation but, on the contrary, would benefit 
the capital of nationals or of foreign residents. Moreover, the 
exchange ra te  would not be affected negatively. Faced with 
emergencies, the government could deal w ith extraordinary 
expenses w ith resources from the country itself. The Finance 
M inister thus em phasized the importance of m aintain ing pub­
lic confidence in the regularity  of the Caixa's paym ents and 
th a t no new placements should be effected w ithout providing 
funds for paym ent of in terests and am ortization (Relatório da 
Fazenda, Brasil 1835: 11-12). The economic climate favored 
such considerations: coffee exports from Rio de Janeiro prov­
ince began to increase, and planters were keen buyers of gov­
ernm ent bonds. As the ir revenues were concentrated, while 
expenses were spread over the year, they bought bonds during 
the harvest period to be then sold when necessary during the 
following months. Government guarantee and the visual pre­
sentation of these titles also enhanced their attractiveness to 
planters. Not only was it a low risk  investm ent of guaranteed 
liquidity, bu t its coupons also simplified the understanding of 
in terest-paym ent periods.
These were also years of great separatist turm oil from the 
N orth to the South of the countrv. A clear indication of the di­
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mensions of these movements is the fact th a t in 1837 the regis­
te r of fiscal revenues does not include five provinces. M ilitary 
repression of these rebellions was violent and made possible 
only because the Regency had access to funds in addition to the 
regular tax  revenues. Between 1838 and 1839 these resources 
were channelled to control revolts in Pará, M aranhão and Ba­
hia. Despite these political events, the price of bonds rem ained 
quite stable, dem onstrating the existence of im portant in ter­
ests upholding the policy of national consolidation. Already 
since 1835 a rebellion was developing in Rio Grande do Sul, 
which gradually acquired a federalist and republican character. 
I t was able to hold out against the central power until 1845.
In 1838 regional resistance to m ilitary interventions made 
recourse to a new foreign loan inevitable, while the domestic 
m arket required the m arket for government bonds, until then 
very much concentrated in Rio de Janeiro, to be extended to 
the other provinces of the Empire. A wide circulation of bonds 
would not only prevent hoarding, bu t also "bind the greatest 
possible num ber of citizens through the ties of private in terest 
to the credit of the state  debt" (Relatório da Fazenda, Brasil 
1840: 14-15). This quote shows th a t there was a clear under­
standing of the political engagem ent and of the identity  of in ­
terests which a m arket for public securities created. In this 
same year, the government began to issue Treasury bonds -  a 
short term  security -  w ith which to solve mom entarily its cash 
deficits and which would be covered by the anticipated reve­
nues. On the political level, the regional uprisings, together 
w ith other popular disturbances, strengthened conservative 
conviction th a t it was necessary to recognize D. Pedro II as hav­
ing come of age a t 14, so th a t the image of the Em peror would 
contribute to the consolidation of a national identity.
A frustra ted  attem pt to obtain a new foreign loan in 1840 
forced the government to issue bonds, which in the two following 
years increased domestic debt by 50 percent. Domestic and for­
eign debts began to balance each other in the composition of 
the to tal public debt, even though in 1843 a new credit had
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been granted in London. As the volume of bonds in circulation 
grew, so did the secondary m arket for these securities, m aking 
it more and more complex to process paym ent of in terests on 
bonds which had changed hands repeatedly. The organization 
of the public bond brokers into a Stock Exchange in Rio de J a ­
neiro was the direct resu lt of the fact th a t they wished to guar­
antee the ir exclusive position as middlemen, while the govern­
m ent was in terested  in having a reliable source of information.
The economic expansion of the country did not reflect in  its 
finances, which were almost always in deficit. A ta riff reform 
became inevitable, even though it would affect in terests  trad i­
tionally identified w ith in ternational trade. Increased export 
taxes (1836) provoked the discontent of the old sugar aristoc­
racy, which feared losing its competitive strength  in the in te r­
national m arket. It had become im perative to do away w ith a 
free-trade policy, which taxed im ports by only 15 percent, and 
to introduce a ta riff system which would be governed by the 
criteria w hether the item  in question could be produced in B ra­
zil and how im portant it was to the domestic m arket. By 1844, 
among the almost 3,000 categories of im ported products, the 
majority was taxed by 30 percent, while some by 40, 50 and 
60 percent, thus bringing some relief to the Treasury. There 
were violent protests from im porters and from G reat B ritain, 
the m ain supplier, and some historians a ttribu te  the radical- 
ization of B ritish policy against the slave trade as retaliation 
against th is decision.
3. D o m e stic  D eb t D u r in g  th e  P r im e  o f  th e  E m p ire , 
1850-1889
Brazilian historiography sees 1850 as the year of profound so­
cial transform ations in the country. Indeed, from th is moment 
on, D. Pedro II takes the reins of government through his Po-
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der Moderador1, the country is internally  pacified, a Land Law 
and a Commercial Code are established, the prohibition of the 
slave trade announces the gradual demise of slavery, and both 
Brazilian diplomacy and the m ilitary tu rn  to a policy of effec­
tive intervention in the River P late Basin. In short, from var­
ious points of view it is clear th a t a transition  has begun from a 
society based on inherited colonial slavery to one which is more 
modern and capitalist.
It is not appropriate in this context to analyze the reasons 
which led to the arm ed Brazilian interventions in U ruguay and 
A rgentina against the governments of Oribe and Rosas, respec­
tively. It is sufficient to be aware th a t the pacification of Rio 
Grande do Sul implied certain m ilitary engagem ents by the 
central power to guarantee its in terests along the border; th a t 
steam  shipping brought new perspectives of economic explora­
tion of the Paraná, Paraguay and U ruguay rivers, and th a t free 
traffic on these waterways was fundam ental for the economic 
exploitation of the Province of Mato Grosso, in C entral Brazil. 
In the nam e of these principles, the Em pire intervened in 1851 
in U ruguay and in 1852 in Argentina, placing in power govern­
ments upheld by the Brazilian Army and Navy, which would 
guarantee free navigation in the River P late Basin.
From the financial point of view, these m ilitary m easures not 
only required a new loan in London, bu t also caused extraordi­
nary  expenses, covered by the issue of short term  Treasury 
bonds whose circulation increased tremendously, compelling the 
Finance M inistry to convert the bonds into long-term securities 
-  an operation which produced great profit for the ir buyers. At 
the same time, in order to protect the new U ruguayan govern­
m ent and to help the Argentine Province of Entre-Rios, an ally 
of Brazil against Rosas, Brazilian funds were lent to these re ­
gions. These capital movements (2,125 "contos de réis" or 
253,000 pounds) originated a foreign credit, for which funds
1 Institu tion  which empowered the Emperor, above the  executive, judicial and legisla­
tive powers, to ratify  resolutions, call Congress into extra session, commute sentences 
etc.
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were quickly secured in the short-term  m arket for Treasury 
notes.
D uring the la st years of the 1850s the London m arket was 
quite favorable for Brazilian securities, which, next to the Rus­
sian, were the best priced. Taking advantage of this situation, 
new foreign loans were contracted, some of which were used to 
nationalize railroad companies in the years 1858, 1859, and 
1860. During th is same period, on the other hand, the volume 
of the bonds of the domestic debt in circulation rem ained 
stable. If an increase in their am ount is found in 1861 and 
1862, it is due to a law which allowed the exchange of railroad 
shares into six percent bonds -  an operation popular w ith for­
eign shareholders, who would soon sell these titles to Brazilian 
investors.
In 1862 a diplomatic incident provoked by B ritish sailors -  
who had recourse to their extraterritorial rights according to 
which B ritish subjects were not subject to Brazilian laws -  
caused the Em pire to suspend relations w ith G reat Britain. 
These rem ained severed until 1865, when the outbreak of the 
Paraguayan W ar forced British diplomacy to renew official 
contacts w ith Brazil. Commercial relation, though, continued 
normally, and in 1863 and 1865 Brazil obtained new loans in 
London and A m sterdam  -  the la tte r already intended for 
purchasing arm s for the war.
The long w ar against Paraguay (1865-70), in which Brazil 
took part on the side of A rgentina and Uruguay, was, however, 
massively financed by domestic resources, through a consider­
able increase in taxes, through sales in the bond m arket and 
through the subscription in 1868 of a national loan of 30,000 
contos-gold (2,190,000 pounds). G reat efforts were made not 
only to expand the public debt m arket to all provinces, bu t also 
to indemnify and pay in bonds those slave-owners who freed 
the ir slaves for m ilitary service on the front. At the same time, 
the servicing of the foreign debt, the expenses incurred on the 
im port of arm s and the cost of the loans given to allied Repu­
blics in the River P late -  including, once the w ar was over, also
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the new Paraguayan government -  w ithout the assistance of 
any new loans in sterling, forced the depreciation of the national 
currency.
The cost of the w ar effort (see Table 1) was calculated shortly 
afterw ards a t about 488,700,000 contos, equivalent to approxi­
mately 45 million pounds (Relatório da Fazenda, Brasil 1872: 
12-16). In th is estim ate all the expenses of the m ilitary m inis­
tries were included as well as those incurred by the M inistry of 
Justice as a resu lt of the mobilization of the M ilitary Police 
and, most im portantly, those of the Finance M inistry. Among 
these were included the foreign loan of 1865, those expenses 
resulting  from the w ar which were borne by the Caixa de 
Amortização, paym ents to pensioners and losses brought about
Table 1: Cost of the Paraguayan War, 1865-1870
M inistry 1,000 Contos 1,000 £
War 272.7 25,120
Finance 127.7 11,760
Navy 59.8 5,510
Justice 0.4 40
Computed in 1871 28.1 2,580
Total 488.7 45,010
Source: Relatório da Fazenda, Brasil (1872: 12-16).
by the w ar to certain government credit operations. The finan­
cial losses of the w ar -  the difference between real and nominal 
value of the foreign loan of 1865, those of the national loan of 
1868 and those of various issues of the domestic debt, as well 
as exchange losses -  were duly computed in these num bers.
The Foreign Office followed Brazilian im perial policy in the 
River Plate w ith m any reservations, fearing th a t the conflict
218 M aria  B a rb a ra  Levy
would resu lt in territo ria l gains which could affect the balance 
of power w ithin the region. Only in 1871, after the w ar had  end­
ed, did Brazil obtain new loans in London. At th a t time the 
Finance M inister was of the view th a t the Treasury, "by a ttrac t­
ing the available national funds, was effectively drawing these 
away from agriculture, commerce and industry, thus ham per­
ing the establishm ent of firms which needed credit to develop"
(.Relatório da Fazenda, Brasil 1871: 11). From th a t year on­
w ard the volume of bonds in circulation tended to stabilize, al­
though, between 1872 and 1873, it became necessary to pay for 
the liquidation of the Companhia Docas do Porto do Rio de J a ­
neiro, whose funds were all bought by banks in Rio de Janeiro 
and, to a lesser extent, in Bahia and Rio G rande do Sul. This 
solution was reached since it had become impossible to delay 
any fu rther a commitment to reduce the tax levels th a t existed 
a t the end of the war.
The railw ay building program then acquired priority because 
it had the effect of extending the land planted for export and 
also tended to foster the in ternal movement of goods and pas­
sengers. These investm ents extended to the planning, construc­
tion and extensions along the m ain axis of the Em pire (the 
Pedro II Railway) and in Bahia and Pernambuco, the old 
N orth-Eastern centers, and in São Paulo and Rio G rande do 
Sul, which began to acquire a certain economic importance. In 
1875, a t the time when these investm ents were considered im ­
perative, the Rio de Janeiro m arket was shaken by a bank cri­
sis which destroyed any hope of funding the venture domesti­
cally. On the other hand, the structure of the foreign capital 
m arket was not suited to loans in parts, such as required for 
investm ents of this nature. The government thus contracted a 
large loan, much above im m ediate needs for railroad expan­
sion. At the mom ent of signing the contract the quotation of 
Brazilian loans was quite favorable, but quite soon the London 
m arket became restless and indecisive, which during the fol­
lowing year resulted in wide fluctuations in the quotation of
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the new issue. Such risks were a contributory factor to the for­
eign m arket being considered a last resort.
C lear evidence of how the government was tu rn ing  to domes­
tic credit sources is the increase between 1876 and 1879 of 
27 percent, th a t is, an average of 6.1 percent per annum. 
Through various contracts, a t first w ith Banco do Brasil, then 
la ter w ith other private banks and bankers, the government 
exchanged short-term  Treasury bills for bonds of the public 
debt of undeterm ined m aturity, thus being able to consolidate 
its floating debt. These operations were not sufficient, however, 
to cover the losses caused by three successive years of drought 
in the N orth-East. To cope w ith these requirem ents, a new n a­
tional loan was issued in 1878 to the am ount of 50,000 contos 
(about 4.9 million pounds), which was subscribed in the more 
im portant provinces.
During the vote on the 1883-84 budget, it became clear th a t 
large am ounts of money were needed to guarantee the in terest 
paym ents to railway companies, to subsidize shipping compa­
nies, to finance schemes for the introduction of steam  energy in 
the sugar mills, to carry out infrastructural works for the port 
of Rio de Janeiro, and to effect a new consolidation of the float­
ing debt and update the service of the public debt. The expend­
iture was to be m et both in the national currency and in s te r­
ling. To resort exclusively to foreign m arkets was bound to re­
sult in foreseeable losses. To carry out the operation entirely at 
home m eant th a t the government would effect sizable purchases 
in the exchange m arket, thus reducing rates. Given these re ­
strictions, the loan of 1883 was authorized on condition th a t it 
be used solely for foreign currency expenses.
In 1884, a proposal of the Finance M inister for the conver­
sion of the domestic debt was approved. This was a delicate 
transaction, involving, besides the in terests of banks and other 
large institutions, those of the great "rentiers" who were solidly 
represented in the Parliam ent. The proposal proved to be 
straightforw ard. The conversion would be effected through the 
creation of a new loan a t a lower in terest ra te  and the previous
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loan would be cancelled. The force of the argum ent resided in 
the fact th a t the bonds were being quoted on the m arket above 
par, thus the six percent ra te  calculated on the nominal value 
of the title actually paid less than  th a t on invested capitals. 
Many believed th a t the m easure would not be followed through 
in view of the strong opposition. But in 1886 it was carried out, 
along w ith a foreign loan of six million pound sterling, which 
guaranteed the consolidation of the floating debt, and another 
of 50,000 contos a t five percent. These two loans together made 
the conversion feasible: the first supplying funds to redeem 
bonds whose holders did not accept the conversion, the second 
dem onstrating th a t there was a m arket for bonds a t th a t level 
of capital return .
The last cabinet of the Empire (June-November 1889) im ­
plem ented a thorough m onetary reform, which recognized the 
right of issue by non-governmental banks on gold reserves, 
since for the first time in many years the exchange ra te  reach­
ed par level. The abolition of slavery, enacted the previous year, 
had forced the Monarchy to support its political base, the for­
mer slave-owners. A foreign loan was obtained in 1888 and a 
national loan issued in 1889, the in ten t of which was to finance 
agriculture in the hope th a t this would provide compensation 
for the slave-owners. This proposal was not approved by P arlia­
ment, which considered th a t they had been more than  compen­
sated by years of unpaid compulsory labor. The national loan 
was then put to finance under very favorable term s agricultural 
credit operations through Bancos de Auxilio à Lavoura. These 
operations resulted in an unusual volume of transactions on 
the Stock Exchange in the shares of issuing banks and of those 
financing agriculture. In this climate of financial euphoria, the 
Republic was proclaimed.
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4. D o m e stic  P u b lic  D eb t D u rin g  th e  F ir st  Y ears o f  th e  
R ep u b lic , 1889-1914
The m onetary and banking reform of the interim  republican 
government extended into various financial areas. Of these, 
those which are of greatest relevance to us are the attem pt to 
convert the debt from five percent paper to four percent gold 
and the transform ation of the national loan of 1889 into re ­
serves for bank issues.
Table 2\ Holders of Brazilian Government Bonds in 1890
Coverage of 5 % bonds in circulation 
Coverage of total domestic debt in circulation
100.0 % 
85.6 %
Individuals 68.8 %
Minors 10.3 %
Banks 9.7 %
Religious institu tions 6.2%
Firm s 3.5 %
Government agencies 0.9 %
State and municipal legislative bodies 0.1 %
Holders unknown (in Amazonas, Goiás and Mato Grosso) 0.5 %
Regional distribution, by States
Rio de Janeiro 87.1 %
Bahia 5.8%
Pernambuco 1.5 %
São Paulo 1.2 %
M aranhão 1.1 %
Others 3.3%
Source: Relatório da Fazenda, Brasil (1891).
The conversion of the debt and the reduction of the in terest 
ra te  would become possible by requiring th a t the paym ent of 
im port taxes should be made in gold, thus enabling the sta te  to 
pay the lower ra te  w ith gold-based funds. The holder would be
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compensated for the one percent difference by the stability of 
the currency he received. As is common in a change of regime, 
the republic severely criticized the Monarchy's neglect in not 
providing for the am ortization of the domestic public debt. The 
first republican Finance M inister thought th a t only "retired" 
funds could be placed in bonds of the public debt, th a t "to pay 
high ra tes  to th is type of bonds diverts private capitals from in­
dustry, encourages the indolence of those who live as parasites 
of the state  and, contributing to an increase in the general ra te  
of money in the m arket, increases the cost of production, re ­
ducing salaries or exaggerating prices" (Relatório da Fazenda, 
Brasil 1891: 120; see Table 2).
The new regime suspended the loans made w ith funds from 
the national loan to Bancos de Auxilio à Lavoura, which, being 
politically identified w ith bank issues, were based on reserves 
constituted h a lf by gold and half by titles from this loan. This 
would bring credit to the urban activities closer to the republi­
can movement. The m ilitary movement which led to the pro­
clamation of the Republic prevented those banks, identified 
with the previous regime, from m aintaining their issues in cir­
culation, and soon these banks called in their issues. Reacting 
to this, the Finance M inister found other bankers and guaran ­
teed in part w ith titles of the public debt the issue of bank pa­
per currency, thus conferring on these issues the confidence 
usually given to Treasury notes. In return , the following re ­
quirem ents were made: (a) at the outset of the operation a 
reduction by two percent in the in terest ra te  of bonds, plus a 
further ha lf percent reduction every year, until the full cancel­
lation of all interest; (b) the bonds would not be allowed to be 
resold; and (c) a fund to be created w ith ten  percent of the 
profits to repurchase the capital invested in the bonds. This 
transaction both freed the government from defraying part of 
the in terest paym ent on the bonds and established the gradual 
cancellation of this debt w ithin a certain time span. The bonds 
of the loan of 1889 were thus w ithdraw n from circulation and 
deposited w ith the Treasury as reserve for bank issues.
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The first years of the Republic were shaken by political move­
m ents of discontent. Besides M onarchist reaction in the South 
of the country, there were also divisions in the arm ed forces, 
w ith the Navy opposing the Army. M ilitary expenditure grew 
considerably to finance increased pay and troop movements. 
Political instability  was reflected in the lack of confidence in 
the financial system and in the constant resort to paper money 
issues, which, in tu rn , expressed itself in panic on the Stock 
Exchange and the depreciation of the currency. Brazilian society 
was a t the time undergoing profound transform ations which 
were provoked by the inflow of im m igrants and the growing 
use of paid labor, which required an increase in funds in circu­
lation. The poor performance of the currency, which was due to 
inflation, frustra ted  the conversion of the debt. To pay four per­
cent gold represented an increasing burden on the Treasury, 
not the least because in 1891 the gold-based tax  on imports 
was suspended. For this reason the government was authorized 
to pay the gold-related in terest on national loans in the domes­
tic currency a t the current exchange rates.
The alliance of the Navy w ith the M onarchists of Rio Grande 
do Sul in 1893 spread the rebel movement to S an ta  C atarina 
and Paraná. Both sides were guilty of massacres, w ith 10,000 
soldiers losing the ir lives. In reaction, the government did not 
hesitate to employ p a rt of the funds deposited as bank reserves 
in the Treasury. The issuing banks which found them selves in 
difficulties were quick in requesting new credits from the gov­
ernm ent, w ith the reserves as guarantee. Exchange specula­
tion in the futures m arket led by the foreign banks reached a 
peak, w ith the government unable to control it. The division of 
the arm ed forces also made it possible for the republican civil­
ians to win the elections.
W ith a conservative government in power which, led by the 
Paulista coffee p lanters, was enjoying great confidence by both 
the domestic and the in ternational financial communities, it 
was possible to obtain in 1895 a new domestic issue of 100,000 
contos (4.2 million pounds) a t 5 percent as a m eans of demon-
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stra ting  the national creditworthiness of the new government. 
The Finance M inister decided to redeem the mass of bank pa­
per money in circulation and to hand back control over issues 
to the Treasury. This required the conversion of the bonds held 
as reserves.2 Exports, which had been until then  weakened by 
the fall in coffee prices, resurged thanks to a new product -  
rubber -  which returned  to the in ternational m arket the confi­
dence th a t Brasil was once again creditworthy. A new loan of 
two million pounds sterling was granted in London to allow the 
servicing of the foreign debt. In fact, it was impossible for the 
government to buy exchange drafts in a highly speculative 
m arket w ithout provoking strong waves.
The South of the country had not yet been fully pacified, 
when in the N orth-East, for the first time in the history of B ra­
zil, the poverty-stricken peasants erupted in revolt. In the reli­
gious settlem ent of Canudos, in the h in terland  of Bahia, a huge 
messianic movement organized itse lf under the leadership of 
António Conselheiro, which first challenged the local élites, 
and then  the Army itself. Another national loan became neces­
sary, but, having been floated a t five percent, it  only found ta k ­
ers a t six percent.3 Between 1896 and 1897 four m ilitary ex­
peditions were launched to quell peasant resistance and finally 
consolidate the Republic.
M easures of m onetary discipline could not be taken  before 
1898 and then  they turned  out to be tru ly  drastic, w ith the im ­
position of a m oratorium  on the foreign debt and the conver­
sion of the domestic debt w ith in terest in gold. In London the 
Brazilian government accepted all dem ands of the creditors. 
During the suspension of the debt service a gold fund was to be 
established w ith London banking houses, and the Rio de J a ­
neiro customs income and other revenues would be held as 
surety. Paper money would be w ithdraw n from circulation in
2 The domestic loan was only registered in 1897.
3 While in the reports of the Finance M inistry the  ra te  is given as five percent, the 
Caixa de Amortização registers it as six percent. It was only in 1902 th a t  both reports 
agree on six percent.
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proportion to the issues from the funding loan, and ha lf of the 
im port taxes would be assessed in gold. From this moment on, 
all official accounting would be recorded both in gold and in 
paper. Domestically the national loans of 1868 and 1879 and 
the four percent gold bonds were reconverted to five percent 
paper. Bonds were standardized since it had become impossible 
to substitu te any lost or dam aged ones and also because the 
Republic rejected all memories of the old-regime and a new 
contract had  come into force. The m arket then  offered five per­
cent bonds, called "general bonds," and from 1897 onward 
others a t six percent. The rem ainder, which paid gold interest, 
were in the process of liquidation. Although established by law 
as early as 1848, it was only then th a t an Amortization Fund 
for domestic loans was created.
After a banking crisis in 1900 which had been provoked by 
deflation, the economy came into full swing. Various railway 
companies were nationalized by m eans of "Rescission Bonds" 
floated in the in ternational m arket, thus freeing the Treasury 
from the undertaking of a profit guarantee of twelve percent 
per annum . Two transactions well exemplify th is period: the 
purchase of Acre from Bolivia and the urban reform in Rio de 
Janeiro. Rubber production promoted a m igratory flow into the 
Amazon forest of N ortheasterners who had been driven from 
their land by drought and the system of the latifundia. A bor­
der dispute arose when the Bolivian Syndicate was formed and 
protested against the presence of Brazilians w ithin the te rri­
tory of their concession. The diplomatic solution rested  on the 
principle of uti possidetis ita possideatis and was facilitated by 
the paym ent of two million pounds sterling to the holders of 
the concession in re tu rn  for Acre's attachm ent to Brazil. Rio de 
Janeiro, gateway to the country, was remodelled and modern­
ized, transform ing a colonial town into an a rt nouveau tropical 
capital. The modernizing th ru s t cut wide avenues w ith electric 
lighting and built a port ready to receive deep draft ships. To 
regularize Acre's situation, Brazil was authorized to avail itself 
of p a rt of the issue of special bonds from the 1903 loan a t five
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percent paper for 17,300 contos (860,000 pounds), and by two 
foreign loans -  8.5 million pounds in 1903-05, and 4.5 million 
in 1911.
The appreciation of the domestic currency, however, h u rt cof­
fee exporters, whose over-production had forced international 
prices down. In 1906 the government intervened both in the 
coffee and in the exchange m arkets. W ith a three million 
pound loan to the S tate of São Paulo it effected a policy of 
stockpiling, thus raising the price of coffee. As to the currency 
m arket, it established the Caixa de Conversão for coffee bills, 
a t the ra te  of 15 d. per milreis. This coincided w ith the expan­
sion of the in ternational capital m arket, which sought oppor­
tunities to invest in the country, m ainly in public service com­
panies, banks and insurance companies. The foreign debt grew 
during these years to supply funds for the modernization of the 
infrastructure and for transport projects. The domestic debt 
grew in 1909 due to the expansion of the railways.
D uring the period preceding the crisis in the in ternational 
capital m arket which took place on the eve of the F irst World 
War, new funds were entering Brazil a t a considerable rate, 
consisting of loans to the federal sta te  and municipal govern­
m ents as well as to private companies. From 1907 to 1911 B rit­
ish placem ents alone, for which comprehensive data  are avail­
able, reached 116.2 million pounds (Relatório da Fazenda, 
Brasil 1912: 201, 207). Prices for almost all Brazilian loans on 
the London m arket and for public bonds on the Rio de Janeiro 
Stock Exchange were quoted above par. Expenses to guarantee 
coffee stock piles were more than  compensated for by the m ain­
tenance of the domestic level of earnings. The loss of the rubber 
m arket, coffee over-production and the rising volume of the 
foreign and domestic debt were all symptoms of the im m inent 
crisis, bu t apparently  did not cause concern to those in power, 
who were always optimistic about future developments.
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5. C o n c lu s io n s
Brazilian public debt can be attributed  during its first phase to 
m ilitary expenses beginning w ith the W ar of Independence, 
followed by the formation of a national sta te  and the struggle 
for hegemony in the River Plate Basin, centering on the P ara ­
guayan W ar in 1864-1870. From then on the cost of the debt 
service was the m ain burden on the budget, except for the pe­
riod of conflict between the Army and the Navy and, im m ediate­
ly afterw ards, the suppression of the peasant revolt in the 
h in terland  of the North-East.
After these turm oils the budget covered both the efforts to 
modernize public services and the paym ent of in terest and 
am ortization of previous debts incurred by m ilitary expenses.
U ntil 1860, th a t is, during the consolidation of the Empire, 
the financing through public debt -  both domestic and foreign -  
kept w ithin a stable limit, never exceeding much more than  
30 percent of fiscal revenue. After the w ar against Paraguay 
this situation was drastically changed, requiring the first con­
version of the domestic debt in 1886 and the negotiation of a 
funding loan for the foreign debt in 1898. The expansion of the 
capital m arket from then on opened up further foreign sources 
of funds, w ith the public debt financing becoming once again 
stable, never exceeding more than  25 percent of current in ­
comes.
The service of the domestic debt is much more system atic 
than  th a t of the foreign debt. Since foreign debt m aturities are 
fixed, while domestic titles are open-ended, the government 
can delay over long periods the paym ent of am ortizations on 
domestic loans, bu t m ust resort to new foreign loans to pay off 
old ones.
The purpose of this detailed annual survey is to show how 
debt financing was a constant issue since independence. From 
the 1840s onwards the domestic m arket acquired an unques­
tionable importance, becoming even dom inant between 1865
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and 1890. W hen foreign financing takes the lead, th is coincided 
w ith a deliberate th ru s t towards Latin American m arkets by 
foreign investors.
A nother aspect which should be em phasized are the three 
renegotiations of the domestic debt. The first, in 1886, and the 
last, in 1898, after initial reactions, was quickly followed by the 
acceptance of the new rules. The second, which was proposed 
under volatile political conditions, tu rned  out to be im practi­
cable. This was not due to the reluctance of the m arket, but be­
cause the government was unable to m aintain its term s. Espe­
cially in the light of the argum ents employed by the m inisters 
responsible, all th ree do, however, provide in teresting food for 
thought for the present situation.
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Figure 1: Brazil - Military and Finance Expenses as Percentage of Total Expenses, 1828-1918 
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Sources: R e la tó rio  da Fazenda, Brasil (1828-1919).
Figure 2: Brazil - G overnm ent D ebt R esources as Percentage o f Fiscal Revenue, 1827-1910
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Figure 3: Brazil - G overnm ent D ebt Service as Percentage o f  Fiscal R evenue, 1827-1910 
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Sources: Tables 10 and 11.
Figure 4: Brazil - Exchange Rate for Fiscal Year, 1824-1918 (Pence per Milreis)
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Notes concerning the Tables 3-9:
a For the first year of each loan, in te rest was the initial balance por ra ta  since the date 
of the loan, 
b In thousands of pound sterling.
c Average discount on amortization. Actual discounts were obtained, when available, 
or estim ated from the years available (loans no. 3, 5, 8, 10-18). The average discount 
of the  o ther loans (no. 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9) were estim ated from the average of various 
loans.
d "Term" signifies the  num ber of the years with positive debt balance. For loans 15, 17 
and 18, Table 4 reports the years un til 1889 and Table 5 the  full term , 
e "Average Annual Debt". The average of the annual balances for each loan during the 
full term  of the loan. For loans 15, 17 and 18, Table 4 sta tes the average up to 1889 
and Table 5 for the  full term , 
f "Total E stim ated Interest" or sum of the annual estim ated interests. After the first 
year of each loan the  annual in terest was the in terest on the averange between the 
previous and the  current blance, pro ra ta  temporis. For loans 15, 17 and 18, Table 4 
adds up the  in terests up to 1889 and Table 5 for the full term , 
g "Funds Imported" indicates the  am ount obtained by each loan, discounted for its type, 
h  "Funds Exported" include the  am ount of amortizations, discounted as described in 
note c, plus 0.3 percent commission on am ortization paym ents as well as the total 
estim ated in terest plus one percent commission on in terest payments, 
i "Export Balance" indicates the funds exported m inus the funds imported for each loan, 
j The "Total Annual Debt" comprises all annual balances of each loan, 
k "Amortization" includes the annual am ortization paym ents for the  different loans or 
the  difference between the previous and the current debt.
1 The "Transfer Balance" states the resu lt of imported funds m inus exported funds,
m "Increase in Debt" totals all new loans.
Tables 8 and 9: "Iss.": issue or am ount issued since the last fiscal year. "Am.": am ortiza­
tion or am ount amortized since last period, "Circ.": ciruclation or total issues minus 
total am ortization un til th a t dat. "Con.": conversion. "Dep.": deposit. "Year" indicates 
the end of the  fiscal year. "Rec.": reconversion.
Sources: For annual balances outstanding, see Bouças (1950). For general descriptions of 
the  loans, see Bouças (1950) and Séries Estatísticas, Brasil (1986: 133). For am orti­
zation discounts, see Relatório da Fazenda, Brasil (1823-1919). Tables 8 and 9: Rela­
tório da Fazenda, Brasil (1827-1919). A fire in the Caixa de Amortização in 1913 
made the publication of th a t year's Relatório impossible. Collecting data  for the 
period 1911-1914 was therefore prevented.
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Table 10: Brazil -  Fiscal Revenues and Funds Obtained from Domestic 
and Foreign Debt, 1827-1910 (Thousands of Pound Sterling)1
Year Fiscal
Revenues
Domestic
Debt
Foreign
Debt
Year Fiscal
Revenues
Domestic
Debt
Foreign
Debt
1827 2,072 870 0 1861 4,702 1,040 1,236
1828 2,211 514 0 1861 5,331 120 0
1829 2,320 415 400 1862 5,754 118 0
1830 2,379 193 0 1863 5,348 788 3,393
1831 2,367 108 0 1864 6,195 407 0
1832 1,966 137 0 1865 6,247 1,103 5,153
1833 1,640 390 0 1866 6,050 1,645 0
1834 2,045 165 0 1867 6,424 1,870 0
1835 2,377 330 0 1868 6,254 5,786 0
1836 2,278 20 0 1869 6,365 3,167 0
1837 2,238 138 0 1870 7,758 3,798 0
1838 1,591 253 0 1871 9,013 363 3,079
1839 2,132 619 313 1872 10,349 2 0
1840 2,451 14 0 1873 11,657 278 0
1841 2,399 447 0 1874 11,130 8 0
1842 2,218 812 0 1875 11,404 941 5,116
1843 1,947 298 623 1876 10,985 955 0
1844 2,200 304 0 1877 10,214 2,323 0
1845 2,554 327 0 1878 10,767 3,942 0
1846 2,763 272 0 1879 10,248 1 0
1847 3,033 36 0 1880 10,815 4,662 0
1848 2,739 24 0 1881 11,767 0 0
1849 2,695 285 0 1882 11,703 0 0
1850 2,989 133 0 1883 11,489 54 4,094
1851 3,789 88 0 1884 11,790 0 0
1852 4,259 510 989 1885 10,246 4,200 0
1853 4,199 2 0 1886 9,844 25,562 6,109
1854 4,025 25 0 1887 17,227 0 0
1855 4,132 4 0 1888 14,532 0 6,108
1856 4,437 1 0 1889 17,123 11,678 17,853
1857 5,454 0 0 1890 20,721 0 0
1858 5,309 1 1,458 1891 18,917 546 0
1859 4,899 0 508 1892 13,319 180 0
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Table 10 (Cont.)
Year Fiscal
Revenues
Domestic
Debt
Foreign
Debt
Year Fiscal
Revenues
Domestic
Debt
Foreign
Debt
1893 12,906 11 0 1902 16,549 0 0
1894 12,358 4 0 1903 20,395 864 25,650
1895 12,894 0 6,326 1904 21,780 0 0
1896 14,015 4,157 0 1905 21,956 0 2,180
1897 11,037 70 0 1906 28,725 0 0
1898 10,248 1,905 1,421 1907 35,625 0 2,850
1899 9,692 0 2,908 1908 27,946 0 5,822
1900 11,714 1 2,869 1909 28,419 1,142 3,494
1901 13,499 0 1,416 1910 33,738 11,875
1 "Year" indicates the end of the fiscal year. "Fiscal Revenues" comprises 
the total income of taxes and duties. "Funds Obtained from Domestic 
Debt" is derived from the total issues of bonds, not discounted for sale 
price (more im portant during the 1800s). "Funds Obtained from For­
eign Debt" comprises all funds produced by foreign loans, already dis­
counted for placement.
Sources: For fiscal revenues and funds obtained from domestic and for­
eign debt, see Relatório da Fazenda, Brasil (1827-1919) and Bouças 
(1950).
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Table 11: Brazil -  Total Government Expenses and Debt Service, 
1827-1910 (Thousands of Pound Sterling)
Year Total
Expenses
Domestic
Debt
Foreign
Debt
Year Total
Expenses
Domestic
Debt
Foreign
Debt
1827 n.d. 52 402 1861 5,646 432 526
1828 1,476 80 294 1861 5,576 436 552
1829 1,614 96 307 1862 5,816 456 548
1830 1,800 98 432 1863 6,306 484 579
1831 1,923 108 267 1864 6,287 518 2,911
1832 1,566 141 267 1865 9,137 548 616
1833 2,486 210 267 1866 12,596 559 977
1834 2,363 230 267 1867 11,988 631 997
1835 2,406 322 267 1868 14,579 658 1,001
1836 2,333 262 291 1869 10,971 832 1,233
1837 2,415 245 315 1870 11,581 1,196 929
1838 2,271 199 312 1871 9,407 1,634 1,070
1839 2,254 202 316 1872 10,272 1,784 1,088
1840 3,257 244 279 1873 12,832 1,857 1,114
1841 2,925 247 279 1874 13,170 1,929 1,107
1842 3,242 259 279 1875 13,708 1,935 1,357
1843 3,131 253 435 1876 13,856 2,090 1,357
1844 2,774 270 309 1877 14,044 1,854 1,411
1845 2,697 286 309 1878 14,935 2,082 1,446
1846 2,631 308 309 1879 16,635 1,976 1,532
1847 2,858 327 309 1880 13,487 2,307 1,382
1848 2,881 329 309 1881 12,703 2,589 1,426
1849 3,025 327 309 1882 12,512 2,099 1,546
1850 3,207 346 314 1883 13,549 2,150 1,452
1851 3,993 381 461 1884 13,716 2,382 1,481
1852 5,088 408 382 1885 13,314 2,162 1,431
1853 3,653 396 1,410 1886 11,919 2,050 1,504
1854 4,227 402 328 1887 18,646 2,176 1,707
1855 4,442 395 445 1888 14,211 2,411 1,892
1856 4,621 395 396 1889 19,819 2,585 18,639
1857 4,480 382 393 1890 23,417 12,667 1,462
1858 5,512 367 432 1891 18,226 1,981 1,560
1859 5,505 360 963 1892 16,332 1,391 1,629
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Table 11 (Cont.)
Year Total
Expenses
Domestic
Debt
Foreign
Debt
Year Total
Expenses
Domestic
Debt
Foreign
Debt
1893 14,468 1,513 1,609 1902 14,328 1,436 1,897
1894 17,553 1,128 1,607 1903 18,129 1,748 2,483
1895 14,453 926 1,764 1904 23,270 1,516 3,449
1896 31,141 940 1,985 1905 20,524 2,273 3,667
1897 14,153 1,000 2,082 1906 28,175 2,594 3,255
1898 21,762 864 1,920 1907 34,705 2,269 3,860
1899 8,922 942 1,632 1908 32,364 2,139 3,701
1900 14,362 1,918 2,266 1909 32,739 1,755 4,544
1901 14,175 1,264 1,861 1910 40,088 2,207 8,737
1 "Year" indicates the end of the fiscal year. "Total Expenses" includes 
all m inistries as well as the service of both the domestic and the for­
eign debt, w ithin the figures for the Finance Ministry. "Debt Service" 
comprehends in terest and am ortization expenses. In terest paym ents 
on both debts are calculated from the outstanding circulation, accord­
ing to the in terest ra te  group, following the contractual data. Annual 
am ortization on domestic debt represents the am ount amortized since 
the last period, see Table 8. A nnual am ortization on the foreign debt 
is calculated as the difference between the previous an the current 
debt, see Table 3.
Sources: For total government expenses and am ortization of in ternal 
debt, see Relatório da Fazenda, Brasil (1827-1919). For am ortization of 
foreign debt, see Bouças (1950).
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Table 12: Brazil -  Exchange Rates, 1824-1918 (Pence per M ilreis)1
1824, Je 49.50 1856,D 27.56 1888,Mr 23.14
1825, Je 50.06 1857,D 26.63 1889,Mr 25.55
1826, Je 50.00 1858,D 25.56 1890,Mr 25.47
1827, Je 41.69 1859,D 25.06 1891,My 19.83
1828, Je 33.16 1861,Mr 25.76 1892,Mr 14.04
1829, Je 27.84 1861,D 25.56 1893,Mr 11.92
1830, Je 23.72 1862,D 26.31 1894,Mr 11.22
1831, Je 23.91 1863,Mr 26.55 1895,Mr 10.06
1832, Ap 29.37 1864,Mr 27.13 1896,Mr 9.72
1833, Je 37.75 1865,Mr 26.31 1897,Mr 8.73
1834, Je 37.81 1866,Mr 24.81 1898,Mr 7.59
1835, Mr 38.50 1867,Mr 23.80 1899,Mr 7.25
1836, Mr 39.05 1868,Mr 21.08 1900,Mr 7.95
1837, Mr 36.22 1869,Mr 17.45 1901,My 10.17
1838, Je 28.81 1870,Mr 19.63 1902,Mr 11.55
1839, Je 29.84 1871,Mr 22.56 1903,Mr 11.98
1840, Je 31.31 1872,Mr 24.27 1904,Mr 12.05
1841, Mr 30.83 1873,Mr 25.27 1905,Mr 13.14
1842, D 28.31 1874,Mr 26.02 1906,Mr 15.97
1843, D 25.81 1875,Mr 26.14 1907,Mr 15.95
1844, Mr 25.66 1876,0 26.23 1908,Mr 15.20
1845, Mr 25.25 1877,Ap 24.82 1909,Mr 15.16
1846, Mr 25.81 1878,0 23.66 1910,Mr 15.43
1847, Mr 27.20 1879,Mr 22.00 1911,D 16.16
1848, Mr 27.25 1880,Mr 21.56 1912,D 16.16
1849, S 25.66 1881,S 22.00 1913, D 16.11
1850, Mr 26.59 1882,Mr 21.53 1914,D 14.80
1851, Mr 28.84 1883,Mr 21.26 1915,D 12.56
1852, Ap 28.56 1884,Mr 21.34 1916, D 12.06
1853, Mr 27.70 1885,Mr 20.16 1917,D 12.83
1854, D 28.00 1886, Ap 18.62 1918,D 13.00
1855, D 27.56 1887, Mr 19.71
1 These fiscal year averages are calculated as pro ra ta  averages be-
tween extremes.
Source: For annual averages, see Séries Estatísticas, Brasil (1986,1).
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Table 13: H olders of G overnm ent Bonds, 1839-1885
% of Total
Circulation
Covered15
Y eara Brazil.
Nation­
als
British
N ation­
als
Other
N ation­
als
Var­
ious
E stab.a
Banks Various
Prov­
inces
Un­
known
Total
100.0 1839 39.6 33.0 8.7 18.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
93.3 1843 56.0 23.2 3.2 17.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
93.2 1844 58.8 18.9 6.0 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
98.8 1845 62.5 18.5 5.0 13.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
99.0 1847 65.4 16.7 4.1 13.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
98.8 1850 68.4 13.7 4.4 13.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
97.4 1851 66.3 12.9 7.3 13.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
100.0 1852 69.6 11.6 2.6 15.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 100.0
100.0 1853 67.3 10.9 2.2 18.5 0.0 1.1 0.0 100.0
100.0 1854 67.9 11.5 4.4 15.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 100.0
100.0 1855 65.1 11.4 4.1 18.3 0.0 1.1 0.0 100.0
100.0 1856 64.4 11.5 3.8 19.2 0.0 1.1 0.0 100.0
100.0 1857 64.3 13.4 2.5 18.7 0.0 1.1 0.0 100.0
100.0 1858 63.2 12.4 3.8 19.5 0.0 1.1 0.0 100.0
100.0 1859 61.2 11.8 5.7 20.2 0.0 1.1 0.0 100.0
100.0 1861 61.6 9.8 3.4 24.2 0.0 1.0 0.0 100.0
100.0 1861 57.2 10.8 2.8 28.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 100.0
100.0 1862 64.7 0.0 11.1 23.2 0.0 1.0 0.0 100.0
100.0 1864 60.6 9.2 1.7 27.6 0.0 0.9 0.0 100.0
100.0 1865 68.5 6.9 1.9 21.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 100.0
100.0 1866 72.6 5.0 2.5 19.1 0.0 0.7 0.0 100.0
100.0 1867 71.3 4.4 2.3 21.3 0.0 .0.6 0.0 100.0
100.0 1868 76.7 2.7 1.4 18.8 0.0 0.5 0.0 100.0
100.0 1869 75.1 3.8 3.4 17.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 100.0
100. l c 1870 72.7 3.5 6.5 17.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 100.0
100.2d 1871 64.6 4.9 6.6 14.8 0.0 9.1 0.0 100.0
100.2d 1872 65.2 6.3 8.9 15.3 0.0 4.1 0.0 100.0
99.8 1873 66.6 5.8 8.6 14.9 0.0 4.1 0.0 100.0
100.6d 1874 62.2 5.7 8.1 15.0 0.0 9.0 0.0 100.0
100.7d 1875 62.3 5.7 7.8 5.1 10.1 9.0 0.0 100.0
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Table 13 (Cont.)
% of Total
Circulation
Coveredb
Year3 Brazil.
Nation­
als
British
N ation­
als
Other
Nation­
als
Var­
ious
E stab.3
Banks Various
Prov­
inces
Un­
known
Total
98.0 1876 62.4 5.6 7.8 5.1 10.0 9.0 0.0 100.0
100.1d 1877 61.8 5.5 6.7 4.9 12.8 8.4 0.0 100.0
101.5d 1878 53.5 1.7 8.5 15.8 10.8 9.8 0.0 100.0
100.8d 1879 52.1 e 7.7 13.9 12.1 8.9 5.2 100.0
101.4d 1880 54.2 e 7.9 14.0 13.6 10.3 0.0 100.0
89 .4C 1881 54.0 e 9.3 12.6 12.5 11.6 0.0 100.0
89.4C 1882 53.9 e 9.1 13.0 12.3 11.8 0.0 100.0
89 .6C 1883 53.8 e 9.1 12.8 11.8 12.5 0.0 100.0
90 .0C 1884 65.7 f f 18.9 2.5 12.9 0.0 100.0
90 .6C 1885 68.5 f f 16.3 1.6 13.6 0.0 100.0
a "Year" indicates the end of the fiscal year. "Estab.": establishm ents, 
b For total circulation of bonds, see Tables 8 and 9. 
c The issue of 1879 is not classified according to holders, 
d Dates and/or classification criteria are not compatible, 
e Included in "Other Nationals", 
f Included in "Brazilian Nationals".
Sources: Relatório da Fazenda, Brasil (1836-1886).
